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Abstract: Data we handle and generate when using Internet-based services reveals information on
our behavior and values. Access control to this data most often lies in the hands of service or storage
providers. With regard to the value ladenness of data sharing in particular, we propose to shift the
focus back to the user by introducing the concept of User-Centric Secure Data Sharing (UC-SDS).
The UC-SDS approach aims at combining technologies and methodologies from the fields of secure
data sharing, secure data outsourcing and value-oriented design. In this paper, we discuss design
alternatives using the example of car telemetry data, considering their value interdependencies with
particular emphasis on the legal context. Our work indicates that through combination of available
building blocks, a higher level of user-centricity in access control is possible than we are used to today.
Keywords: value-oriented design; secure data sharing; secure data outsourcing
1 Introduction
In the light of mobile and cloud computing, social networks and the Internet of Things, we
use an increasing amount of Internet-based services every day. Every time we use such
services, we give away significant amounts of personal information. Not only the data we
submit, but also our access and usage patterns reveal who we are. Data and usage patterns
represent our values, thoughts and views. While services, of course, require some user data
to provide their functionality, a major research question can be stated as follows: To which
degree can we technically restrict the use of data and observable usage patterns to only
those services that are authorized by the user him or herself?
In this paper, we outline the concept of a User-Centric Secure Data Sharing (UC-SDS)
approach. UC-SDS aims at providing the user with a maximum of control over his or her data
by reducing necessary trust in third parties. Following the idea of user-centricity, we assess
the available technical building blocks with respect to their underlying trust dependencies.
We discuss technical means for Secure Data Sharing (SDS) and Secure Data Outsourcing
(SDO), including methods to hide the patterns of data queries and cryptographically enforced
access control, indicating that a much higher level of access control is possible than we are
used to today. Furthermore, the methods discussed allow for a separation of data storage
from service provisioning and thus significantly contribute to data portability.
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However, there is a price tag associated to user-centricity: The downside might be that a user
cannot bear the costs or the workload. While a loss of data can cause a loss of reputation and
face, a slow service might decrease the service accessibility or the user’s satisfaction. Thus,
a second research question needs to be addressed: In which way is User-Centric Secure
Data Sharing influenced by values – and how could those be balanced by a user?
In this paper, we start a discussion on the value ladenness of the UC-SDS approach. Besides
individual values, we consider in particular the legal context, reflecting a consensus on
societal values. The UC-SDS approach aims at facilitating the economic advantages of
modern cloud technologies, without requiring the user to give up data sovereignty.
Our work on UC-SDS was inspired by the concept of user-centric identity management.
Shifting the focus towards the user is also a major goal of the “Solid”3 project at MIT led
by Tim Berners-Lee. Solid aims at providing “true data ownership” by implementing Web
Access Control (WAC)4. While the project is in an early stage, protecting stored data using
cryptographic mechanisms seems to be out scope for Solid.
Based on a data sharing scenario for telemetry data collected by cars, we will explore the
design space of UC-SDS. In recent work, Sookhak et. al. present an approach [So17] that
makes use of Proxy Re-Encryption, but the suggested architecture relies on the storage
provider to enforce logical access control. Thus, the storage provider is also able to obtain
access to the plaintext of data encrypted by the user.
The UC-SDS approach aims at combining technologies and methodologies from the fields
of SDS and SDO, considering societal and individual values in the design process as shown
in Figure 1.
Fig. 1: Structural overview (including section numbers).
2 Example Scenario & Building Blocks
In this section we will sketch a real-world scenario that is used in the course of this paper to
motivate, illustrate and discuss the implications of UC-SDS. Furthermore, we will introduce
the fields of research that provide the technical building blocks for User-Centric Secure
Data Sharing, namely Secure Data Sharing (SDS) and Secure Data Outsourcing (SDO),
and present related work with respect to Value-oriented Design.
3 https://solid.mit.edu/
4 https://github.com/solid/web-access-control-spec
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UC-SDS: Exploration of Concepts and Values 13
2.1 Example Scenario
A frequently considered case yielding the necessity to share data can be found in the field of
smart vehicles. A modern car is able to generate extensive amounts of telemetry data per
ride that can be used in numerous contexts. Assuming a state-of-the-art electric car, we will
consider four actors that are interested in the car’s telemetry data:
Manufacturer The manufacturer of the car monitors cars in use to allow target-oriented
product improvement. Therefore, the manufacturer is mainly interested in technical data like
statistics about motor behavior or battery condition. Additionally, further consumer-oriented
services like on-demand maintenance could be implemented based on that data. But, the
gathered telemetry data might as well allow competitors to deduce business secrets by
in-depth monitoring a car’s behavior. Thus the manufacturer is also interested in keeping
sensitive subsets of data confidential.
Insurance Company There is in upcoming interest in car telemetry data by insurance
companies: Usage Based Insurance (UBI) is a concept that couples insurance rates to usage
patterns, rewarding cautious behavior [Ha14]. Consequently the insurance company has a
demand for car telemetry data to track the driving profile of their customers.
Power Supplier Another actor interested in car telemetry data might be a power supplier.
Approaching smart-grid technologies, controlling and predicting energy demands becomes
a key feature of modern power distribution networks [Gu13]. Following the Vehicle-to-Grid
(V2G) approach [KT05], electric cars can be used to handle load peaks. In this context
information about the usage profile of these cars is of particular value for power suppliers.
User Finally, we refer to the driver of a car as the user. The possibility of profiling a
user with the help of telemetry data gathered by his or her car causes privacy concerns.
Generating all the data discussed before, the user becomes the data subject (c.f. Section 3)
and thus, has a fundamental interest in controlling the data, as it implicitly represents his or
her individual values. Beginning with location information and driving style up to number
of passengers or approximate payload, an extensive amount of private information could be
revealed allowing to deduce personal preferences.
The described actors can be interpreted in terms of roles. For example, a car might be used
by multiple drivers and usually a plethora of manufacturers is involved in its production. To
reduce unnecessary complexity, in the following we will consider the described actors as
single subjects. Furthermore, we do not distinguish between driver and owner of a car.
The prevailing approach to gather the necessary data is for each actor to deploy custom-built
technologies. Obviously, the preferred way to satisfy all information demands would be
to use a standardized built-in system to collect the data. Although technically diverse,
the current implementations have in common that they leave the user with little to no
control on the data he or she generated. To satisfy the demands of all involved actors, there
are essentially two requirements: First, the data has to be stored in a standardized way
establishing interoperability. Second, a proper way to share data between the actors has to
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be found, while providing the user with a mechanism to control access to the data. The latter
aspect is the one we address in this paper.
2.2 Secure Data Sharing
While access control is required for confidentiality and integrity demands, data needs to be
shared to allow IT-based collaboration. Conventional data sharing approaches entrust the
Storage Provider (SP) to perform logical access control. In case these SPs are considered
as honest but curious attackers (c.f. Section 4.1), they cannot be trusted to perform access
control correctly. In context of Secure Data Sharing (SDS) cryptographic mechanisms are
used to enforce access control in untrusted environments, ensuring that only the owner and
the members of a sharing group can access the data [KH16, Th14].
In general, SDS offers two basic operations: First, granting access to a resource and
second, revoking access to a previously accessible resource. Granting access means to allow
decryption, while revoking access corresponds to preventing decryption in the future. Thus,
access revocation requires to re-encrypt resources.
A concern with regard to revocation are so called rollback attacks, in which a former grantee
restores a prior state so that he or she regains access to the resource. Although preventing
this attack in general is complex [Li04], the attack vector can be addressed by periodic
signatures that indicate freshness in case of only a single writing user.
For the implementation of SDS we consider three different cryptographic mechanisms.
Whereas the more advanced cryptographic mechanisms provide additional functionality,
they usually come with a performance trade-off [KH16].
Traditional Cryptography Well-established SDS protocols (e.g., [Go03]) make use
of common cryptographic primitives like symmetric and asymmetric encryption. These
traditional approaches rely on trusted Public Key Infrastructures (PKI) to verify the
authenticity of participants and to allow key distribution. All cryptographic operations are
carried out on the clients, while the PKI usually represents an external trust anchor.
Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE) Like the traditional approach, PRE [At06] relies on a trusted
PKI, but allows to delegate re-encryption of ciphertexts to a proxy that will not be able to
access the plaintexts.
Attribute Based Encryption (ABE) While ABE [SW05] relies on a trusted PKI as well,
it allows to encrypt data with respect to attributes, which potentially apply to multiple users,
resulting in ciphertext that can be decrypted by groups of users. Participants need to trust
Attribute Authorities (AA), responsible for attribute binding. Advanced implementations
also include PRE for attribute revocation [YJ14].
When talking about SDS, a common implicit assumption is that the data under consideration
is stored and eventually accessed multiple times. But given todays high-volume and
fast-moving data, processing data streams directly has become a considerable alternative.
Stepping back from the afore mentioned assumption, the Data Stream Processing paradigm
represents another domain of SDS. In this context, enforcing access control for streamed
data is a hot topic of current research [Th16].
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UC-SDS: Exploration of Concepts and Values 15
2.3 Secure Data Outsourcing
Secure data outsourcing has been an active research topic for the last two decades. The
underlying question is: How can encrypted data be queried efficiently? An early approach
which addressed this problem is called Searchable Encryption (SE) [Ka12]. This approach
has the data encrypted and still has fast access times on data, but it comes with two drawbacks:
First, this approach only works with a deterministic encryption scheme, which is vulnerable
to inference attacks as described in [Na15]. Since the same keyword is encrypted to the
same ciphertext, an attacker can analyze the frequency of equal ciphertexts and compare the
frequency to public data, to infer plaintexts. Second, SE approaches leak access patterns of
data. Similar to the description above, a more powerful attacker, who has access to the data
and the network traffic to and from the SP, can also analyze the frequency of queries and
responses of a certain data set and perform an inference attack on this information.
These two drawbacks combined lead to more recent approaches, which use an encrypted
index structure that is able to work with probabilistic encryption schemes and that obfuscates
access patterns with mechanisms like data node shuffling and the retrieval of dummy
elements [St13]. This is done by a mediator server, which all database queries are directed
to. In these approaches, the mediator is the only entity that directly communicates with the
database. The mediator has to be hosted in a trusted environment to ensure that the access
patterns of queries are hidden. While these mechanisms add an overhead in access times
and network traffic, they also provide a much higher level of confidentiality.
2.4 Value-oriented Design
To provide a value-oriented service, the consideration of values already has to start in the
design phase. It is difficult to express values like power, self-direction and benevolence
in well-defined functional or non-functional requirements during the design phase. An
additional challenge is that almost all software products carry value conflicts between
different stakeholders.
One approach to bridge the gap between values and system requirements or technical
properties was proposed by Van de Poel [VdP13]. Based on value-sensitive design [Fr96],
he suggests an intermediate layer between values and system requirements, which is called
norms. Norms instantiate values in form of individual or societal restrictions to a certain
scenario. In this paper we distinguish between societal values, e.g. inherent to the law
(c.f. Section 3), and individual values like “self-direction” or “benevolence” (c.f. Section
4.4). By analyzing the legal framework, we consider societal values stated in the law. In
addition, we use a top-down approach to exemplify how individual values (based on the
refined value model of Schwartz [Sc12]) affect our proposed concept. Similarly to [Ne16],
we outline which normative elements can be expressed through which design alternatives
for an example scenario. By making explicit how the proposed normative elements affect
the design decision, we can visualize possible value conflicts.
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3 Legal Considerations
The societal values to be considered with regard to UC-SDS are related to the question
by which legal means a “European data economy” could be developed. The automotive
sector could serve as a blueprint, as regulatory efforts are already advanced. In this paper we
use the German law as a starting point to consider national and European legislation. The
most urgent preliminary question is “who should have the right to process and monetize
vehicle-related data” [Ho15, p. 359]. Recent efforts5 show that the European Commission
evaluates the possibilities for addressing the issue of access to sensor data.
3.1 Economic Perspective
From an economic perspective the Commission discusses the justification of a legal
framework for a “Data Ownership”6 versus an “Access Right” based on competition law.
Concerning “Data Ownership” it is mostly assumed that due to the absence of physicality
there is no ownership or property right of data under civil law [BJ16, p. 413]. Nevertheless,
some legal scholars assume a similar right for the vehicle sector with regard to Section 303a
German Criminal Code (StGB) [Vo16, p. 6]. This assumption of ownership is questionable.
If data could be owned, the owner would have exclusive control over the data. However,
vehicle-related data is not only of technical nature, but also contains information about
the person using a vehicle [Ku16, p. 510]. While Buchner argued that vehicle-related data
would be “ephemeral and therefore not relevant for data protection law” [Bu15, p. 374],
the argument does not hold for modern big data applications. Hence, privacy has to be
considered in terms of data protection law (see Section 3.2). This should apply, even if a
driver cannot be identified, to avoid restraints upfront [Ho15, p. 361]. Taking into account
that data ownership would be transferable, while the data subject remains the same, one
can argue against a “Data Ownership” that privacy is a fundamental right and, ultimately,
part of the human dignity (Art. 1 para. 1, Art. 2 para. 1 German Constitution). From a legal
point of view it is not possible to trade-in the right to informational self-determination or
sell exclusive rights concerning personal data. This would involve a possibility to waive
the right of human dignity, which is not foreseen under the German Constitution. As data
subjects have the right of erasure, “Data Ownership” would also be constantly limited and
subject to a pending condition of revocation. Additionally the distinction between personal
and non-personal data is not always clear and more often even fluid over time. Overall, the
concept of “Data Ownership” is inappropriate, in order to achieve legal certainty in the
data-driven economy.
This conclusion does not answer the question whether and how a legal framework concerning
an “Access Right” based on competition law could be established. The European General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) encompasses the protection of privacy as well as the
“free flow of data” as regulatory targets. The Commission remarks that “privacy concerns
5 Commission Staff Working Document on the free flow of data and emerging issues of the European data economy.
Accompanying Communication Building a European data economy COM(2017) 9 final.
6 The “Ownership”-metaphor can be misleading: Here, the term is used in the legal sense of physical possession.
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are legitimate concerns but should not be used as a reason to restrict the free flow of data
in an unjustified way. The GDPR fosters the necessary trust for data processing and is the
foundation for the free flow of personal data in the EU”7. Considering this background,
another relevant topic is the “right to data portability” in Art. 20 GDPR. According to
the common understanding, this right was established to pursue competitive purposes in
order to avoid “lock-in-effects”, corresponding to antitrust law, or a monopolistic collection
of data [Pa17, on Art.20 Rn.6]. As Competition Law already regulates market-dominant
ventures, the remaining question is: How to adapt the existing competition law framework
to modern data sharing technologies.
During the consultation process started by the EU-Commission5, access to and re-use of
personal data with respect to data generated in cars are part of the legal discussion. The issue
of access to in-vehicle data has been discussed in the framework of a Cooperative Intelligent
Transport Systems (C-ITS) stakeholder platform8. Primarily, a set of guiding principles
for access to in-vehicle data have been developed, including: “fair and undistorted
competition”, prior “consent” of the data subject, “standardized access” and “free
choice” of the data subject. Moreover relevant to our approach it is also recommended to
foster the principle of “Privacy by Design”, as it has been requested in German literature
[KW15, p. 387]. At the moment discussions focus on a data server platform in an “Extended
Vehicle Concept”, while the control of the access conditions and extent of the in-vehicle data
is in the hands of themanufacturers. An alternative concept proposed another implementation
of the data server platform, managed and controlled by a neutral third-party. By incorporating
the established principles in the design of UC-SDS, we aim at providing another option.
3.2 Data Protection Perspective
Themain requirements of data protection lawwhichmust bemet byUC-SDS should be based
on the GDPR’s key principles. With regard to access to data the GDPR takes – as already
set out above – also aspects of economic competition into account. Hence, interpretation of
the protective provisions of the GDPR in the context of technical access control must also
take aspects of competition as well as data protection into due consideration.
Therefore, the interpretation of the relevant key principles – especially the principle of
“DataMinimization” as set out in Art. 5 GDPR and the requirement of “Privacy by Design”
as laid out in Art. 25 GDPR – must aim at reciprocal optimization of competition as well as
data protection. A technology design based on the principle of data minimization has been
interpreted in literature as a right to “data-free mobility” [Ku16, p. 510]. This would mean,
that from a data protection point of view only small amounts of data could be transmitted to
the data serving platform and transmission must be done under consideration of possible
means of pseudonymization. In the past, methods of data minimization for connected cars,
like frequent change of pseudonyms, did not function sufficiently well [Ha15, p. 371]. While
7 Communication from the Commission to the European Committee of Regions, “building an European data
economy”, COM(2017) 9 final, Brussels, 10.1.2017, p. 5.
8 See http://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/its/c-its_en.
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the wording of Art. 5 GDPR indicates the necessity to prevent the collection of personal
data, a way of data minimization could also be seen in the possibilities of encryption. By
encrypting data and providing cryptographic access control to the consumer, privacy risks
may be minimized, while competitors’ interests in using this data may be balanced out.
Additional problems discussed in literature regarding “responsibility” for compliance with
data protection regulations [Ro16, p. 111 f.] are far easier to solve as well. Since the platform
operator himself does not have access to the data, responsibility to fulfill data protection
obligations falls to the service providers accessing the data.
When it comes to the technical design, the most serious problems encountered refer to
“transparency” and “consent”, which is necessary to legitimate the data processing in most
cases. Some experts consider the actual regulations concerning data protection information
as insufficient to provide the person, to whom the car is registered to, and the driver with the
required “transparency” about current collection and processing of personal data [Ro16, p.
111 f.]. Even if this requirement is narrowed down to the knowledge of facts that are crucial
for the data subjects decision, whether or not to give consent for processing of personal data,
it is still difficult to guarantee sufficient information as required in Art. 7 GDPR [Bu15, p.
372].
3.3 Access Control Approach
We showed that the regulatory approach of an “Access Right”, in contrast to the idea
of “Data Ownership”, could in principle provide a better balance between economic
regulation and data protection from a legal perspective. Furthermore, we outlined that,
in the light of an upcoming “European data economy”, the classical Data Minimization
paradigm is contradictory to the concepts of Big Data. With respect to the potential
of Big Data applications, we suggest shifting from Data Minimization towards user-
enforced cryptographic access control, as a possible compromise. Following this approach,
competition as well as data protection concerns could be brought together in a well-balanced
manner. In the following, we will incorporate the previously described legal key principles,
representing a societal canon of values, into the design of UC-SDS by considering them in
the process of establishing technical requirements.
4 UC-SDS Design Space Exploration
In this section we specify the UC-SDS approach by outlining its foundations. Then, we
analyze the design space of UC-SDS with respect to the technical building blocks introduced
in Section 2. Finally, we provide an example on how design decisions can be supported by
considering individual values.
4.1 Foundations
Legal Framework As shown in Section 3, from an economic perspective, UC-SDS
has to guarantee fair and undistorted competition, avoiding data access by an omniscient
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market role (e.g., a storage provider). Hence, data should be encrypted. Due to his or her
fundamental rights regarding data privacy, the consumer should be in the sole position
to decide who should have access to the vehicle-data by performing cryptographic access
control. Ensuring this could also avoid a targeted hindering of competitors (Section 4 Nr.
10 UWG) or a violation of antitrust law [Ho15, p. 365]. Finally, enforcing interoperability
also allows the consumers’ free choice to select services.
Additionally, the UC-SDS approach is able to bring together competition and data protection
concerns. With regard to the mandatory withdrawal of consent, cryptographic access
control has an advantage compared to conventional methods (e.g., [Bu15, p. 377]), because
withdrawing consent can be realized straightforward by revoking the access permissions.
Since withdrawal of consent concerns only future processing of data, the legal principles
are duly taken into account. Another requirement that can be deduced for an UC-SDS
implementation is that giving consent can be done separately for each service. Furthermore,
the user must be able to separately withdrawn consent in a similar way [Ku16, p. 514].
Data Model In context of SDS, the data model determines the required granularity of
the SDS mechanism to be applied. The granularity describes the level of access control
enforcement, i.e. what is considered as the smallest entity to be controlled. Thus, we
distinguish three elementary forms of data: First, data blobs with arbitrary internal structure,
e.g., files, representing the most common use case for SDS. In case of files, external
structuring like directories has to be considered as well. Second, databases containing
multiple records of structured data. In case of databases we assume a fixed scheme providing
the basis for access control policies. Finally, data can be provided in form of continuous
data streams that are not necessarily stored but processed on the fly.
In this paper we will discuss UC-SDS based on the scenario described in Section 2.1. Given
the structure of telemetry data, the generated data might be processed following the data
stream paradigm or stored and queried using a database. Considering varying actors, e.g.,
due to switching the insurance company or power supplier, we choose to support access to
historical data by using a database as an example.
Attack Model In this paper we consider an honest but curious attacker, who has access
to the network connections between all participants and to the physical data, as it is stored
on the server of one of the participants. This includes the actors or the Storage Provider
themselves as possible attackers.
Requirements The following security requirements must be fulfilled by any solution to
be considered for the UC-SDS approach: (S1) An attacker can never see the plain text of
outsourced data. (S2) At any given time, actors can only access the data they are allowed to
access. (S3) Attackers should infer as little as possible through access patterns.
In addition, the following functionality requirements must be met: (F1) A user must stay in
control of his or her shared and outsourced data. (F2) It must be visible which data is shared
with whom. (F3) Access rights to data must be cryptographically granted and revoked. (F4)
Data must be accessible to actors, independent of the users availability.
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4.2 Secure Data Sharing Aspects
When it comes to Secure Data Sharing the basic question to answer is:Whom do we need to
trust? The core of a Secure Data Sharing approach is its protocol, which defines how access
and key management interactions are carried out. The protocol codifies different roles and
their relations based on the underlying cryptographic primitives. Although the resulting
architectural designs may vary for different protocols, the underlying trust anchors are
determined by the cryptographic mechanisms in place. It is up to the designer, where to cast
the anchors by composing the protocol. Therefore, we will assess the feasibility of different
SDS approaches by considering the trust models inherent to the available cryptographic
primitives:
Traditional Cryptography Using traditional cryptographic mechanisms we can fulfill
the first two security requirements defined in Section 4.1: By encrypting the users’ data
we ensure that an attacker cannot access the plaintext (S1). By sharing the encryption key,
we can grant access to a chosen subset of actors (S2). To revoke access, the user needs to
re-encrypt the data and share the new key. In context of the telemetry scenario, the car itself
is able to detect rollback attacks by monitoring the freshness of the data. The functional
requirements (F1) and (F2) need to be addressed by providing a sufficient management
interface to the user. (F4) requires the actors to be able to access the outsourced data
regardless of the user’s availability. This can be realized by using encrypted keys, called
Lockboxes [KH15], which are stored together with the data. The main drawback of this
concept is the fact that the user’s device is responsible for re-encryption. In case of large
amounts of telemetry data, this could be a time-consuming task.
Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE) To increase the flexibility in case of re-encryption, we
consider two different approaches: First, the user explicitly determines the time of re-
encryption and provides the necessary resources. Second, re-encryption could be outsourced.
Using PRE, the proxy would not be able to access the plaintext, satisfying security
requirement (S1). In contrast, the security requirement (S2) as well as the functional
requirements (F1) and (F2) might be violated: A malicious proxy, could suppress re-
encryption requests of the user. Consequently, the user has to put some level of trust into the
re-encryption proxy. With respect to the scenario described in Section 2.1, two options for
mapping the proxy-role to participants seem reasonable: (P1) Trusting the service provider
to execute re-encryption. (P2) Trusting the manufacturer to execute re-encryption. As the
SP is assumed to be honest but curious, (P1) complies with the attacker model in place. Only
in case the SP cooperates with malicious actors, using PRE would open an attack vector.
Hence, outsourcing re-encryption to the manufacturer (P2) seems counterproductive: As
the manufacturer is one of the considered actors, taking the role of the re-encryption proxy
at the same time would allow him to retain access on data. But, given that the manufacturer
is in charge of the car’s hardware, the user already has to trust the manufacturer. Thus, the
second option would effectively reduce the necessary trust relations.
Attribute Based Encryption (ABE) The idea of user-centricity is to provide the user
with a maximum of control over his data. Thus, the user will be imposed with the full
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UC-SDS: Exploration of Concepts and Values 21
responsibility to judge the trustworthiness of all involved actors. In a real world scenario, this
assumption is rather unrealistic. ABE can be used to reduce complexity by implementing
levels of indirection. Introducing trusted AAs, the user is still able to enforce custom access
policies, while trust relations are simplified. For example, a national regulatory authority,
acting as an AA, could bind a dedicated attribute to insurance companies that comply with
data protection laws.
SDS increases computational costs due to the additional cryptographic operations. Fur-
thermore, advanced cryptographic primitives typically cause higher costs than traditional
approaches. But, due to the nature of user-centricity, any UC-SDS system is limited in terms
of complexity to what is manageable for a single user. With respect to recent performance
evaluations [KH15, KH16], we conclude that performance considerations in terms of trade-
offs between different cryptographic methods are negligible regarding an SDS protocol
applied in context of UC-SDS.
4.3 Secure Data Outsourcing Aspects
Secure Data Outsourcing mechanisms enrich our concept to meet two requirements, namely
indexing for fast data access and low information leakage to protect the data from inference
attacks. The question to answer is: How can we store and retrieve data securely and
efficiently? There is an inherent trade-off between retrieving data securely and efficiently.
More efficient indexes, even encrypted ones, leak more information about the data, because
a potentially untrusted actor gains information which is needed to perform queries more
efficiently. Our goal is to only leak information which the attacker either already knows or
with which he can not infer sensitive data.
Fast Index Access (FIA) We assume that each data set contains a summary of the
telemetric driving data for one day and that one data set is uploaded per day. In this case
all actors who want access to the data already know that a data set is inserted once every
day, so there is no point in trying to hide or mask this insert. The date field of the data set
makes a good index, as it is known to all participants and thus, there is no need to encrypt it.
All other columns should be encrypted with a probabilistic encryption scheme. Otherwise,
especially the manufacturer, as a possible attacker who has a vast amount of background
knowledge, might infer big parts of data, encrypted with a deterministic or order-preserving
encryption scheme, by performing a frequency analysis.
With this setup, it is possible for each actor to query data sets according to their date.
The whole data set is retrieved even if an actor only has access to one value, so there is a
considerable amount of overhead in network traffic. An attacker as defined in Section 4.1
can see for every query (1) who retrieves data, and (2) how many and (3) which data sets,
identified by their date, are retrieved. Additionally, an attacker can keep track on (4) how
often a certain data set has been retrieved.
Low Information Leakage (LIL) To use the security mechanisms of an encrypted index
structure, we need to have a mediator server to execute shuffling operations or to retrieve
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dummy data sets to hide access patterns. There are several possibilities to place such a
mediator: (M1) A user could operate his own server, which works as a mediator, (M2) The
mediator software could be run on the server of the storage provider, (M3) The mediator
software could be run on a server of the car manufacturer, making him the central database
access point for all participants, (M4) The mediator software could be installed at every
party’s server, which wants to access data.
Even though the options (M1) and (M4) are user-centric, truly they do not seem practical
for many scenarios, since they involve a lot of manual installation and maintenance on
either the user’s side or the side of all involved actors. If they can be implemented, they are
definitely to be preferred. Whether option (M2) or (M3) is a better choice highly depends
on the scenario. In our case we would opt for (M3), since the manufacturer knows some
of the information we would hide with an encrypted index structure anyways, because he
knows the kind of data that is produced by the car. The car manufacturer can outsource
encrypted data on behalf of the user with a protocol like Oblivious RAM. This means that
every database operation would be send to the car manufacturer, and then executed by him.
The key management and the encryption of data, and therefore the management of access
control would remain with the user. This solution eliminates the information leakage of (1),
(3) and (4) as defined above while still remain a decent query latency.
4.4 Design and Value Considerations
To implement a UC-SDS system, we can combine the previously discussed building blocks
of SDS and SDO. Figure 2 shows how a solution for low information leakage might be
combinedwith proxy re-encryption. In this example, themediator as well as the re-encryption
proxy, which acts like another user from the mediator’s perspective, are operated by the
manufacturer. Thus, the manufacturer is entrusted with hiding access patterns and the timely
execution of re-encryption, in case a user revokes access of an actor. As the sketched design
is only one of many possibilities to combine the available building blocks, an additional
questions comes up: How can we decide on the various design alternatives?
Fig. 2: UC-SDS design combining LIL (M3) and PRE (P2).
At this point we suggest to incorporate individual values, i.e. values of the user, following
the approach of [Ne16], in which values are translated to technical properties. This approach
is being used to grant a starting point for a discussion about the implications on values
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of each solution. We have identified that, among others, the following values affect our
UC-SDS approach: Power - Resources as “Power through control of material and social
resources”, which is affected by the monetary cost of any given solution. Self-Direction
- Action as “Freedom to determine one’s own actions”, which is affected by the number
of operation modes a user can choose from. Benevolence - Dependability as “Being
a reliable and trustworthy member of the ingroup”, which is affected by the amount of
trust towards others, that is necessary for a chosen solution. From these values we can
derive four normative elements, which will help to evaluate the three values with regard to
our scenario: “Minimize Cost” expresses the requirement to keep operating costs as low
as possible. “Individual Protection Levels” expresses the requirement to allow differing
protection levels for different data attributes. For example, uncritical data attributes can be
stored unencrypted to boost performance. “Large Design Space” expresses the requirement
to set up a very individual solution with many operation modes to choose from. “Minimize
necessary trust” expresses the requirement to minimize the trust in third parties, which is
needed to operate the chosen solution. Figure 3 aids a discussion about design alternatives
Fig. 3: Dependencies of Values, Normative Elements and Technical Properties. Annotations indicate
preferred design decisions with respect to a single Normative Element.
on a very basic and simplified level in taking affected values into account. The letters on
relations express, which design option fulfills a normative element best. For example, it can
be seen that A (Fast Index Access) minimizes cost better than B (Low Information Leakage)
or that X (Traditional Crypto) minimizes necessary trust better than Y (PRE) and Z (ABE).
The visualization also shows the implicit trade-offs between values. Option A is better in
terms of minimizing cost and providing individual protection levels of data, whereas option
B provides a large design space.
5 Discussion
We have presented an example scenario dealing with telemetry data collected by cars
to illustrate the implications of UC-SDS. While this scenario clearly shows the potential
of UC-SDS, constraining assumptions had to be made with respect to the scope of this
paper. For a real-world application it has to be considered that the driver of a car might not
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be the owner and might change frequently. Likewise, the role of the manufacturer has to
be carefully reviewed. On the one hand, a car manufacturer is in charge of implementing
the data collection mechanisms, implicitly controlling which data is acquired and thus
accessible for others. It has to be guaranteed that a manufacturer cannot exploit this central
position. Assuming sufficient competitive pressure this might be a self-regulating process.
On the other hand, even in case of UC-SDS there are legitimate data-processing-operations
performed by the manufacturer that should not be prohibited by the user. This concerns data
about security-relevant components. Manufacturers have to fulfill their product monitoring
obligations to prevent liability risks. A UC-SDS system has to be designed in a way that
access to those data is ensured for manufacturers. In context of the scenario, the selected
data model, described in Section 4.1, is up to discussion as well. Considering the actual
information needs of the involved actors, a more fine-grained specification will be required.
From the legal perspective, we showed that UC-SDS enables to balance the main legal
principles on competition- and data protection law level: For example, UC-SDS fosters
“fair and undistorted competition” by providing confidentiality and realizes “consent” by
enabling the user to perform access control. According to the value model of Schwartz
[Sc12], the European regulation efforts can be understand as an approach to establish a
framework to balance individual values. In this context, the interrelations of societal and
individual values should be considered for further discussion, e.g., with respect to liberty
rights. The practical usability of UC-SDS heavily depends on the possibilities of the user
to interact with the system. For example, given the telemetry data scenario, a user interface
could be part of the car or a separate (mobile) application. The underlying question, which
level of complexity a user can handle, is beyond the scope of this paper and remains to be
addressed.
Overall, we have outlined that the necessary technical building blocks to implement UC-SDS
are available. More work is needed to develop a protocol and architecture with respect to
the particular use case. To decide on the various design alternatives, we suggest taking
values into account. While societal values determine requirements for UC-SDS, e.g. in form
of laws, we sketched how individual values and value-conflicts can be considered as well.
Centering on the user, a preeminent trade-off manifests between minimizing trust relations
(“benevolence”) and cost minimization (“power”), as cutting down trust relationships
significantly increases the users’ workload. Given the complexity of the discussed scenario,
the consideration of values has to be intensified. Finally, following a user-centric approach
itself represents a value-laden decision.
6 Conclusion & Future Work
In this paper we have introduced the idea of User-Centric Secure Data Sharing to restrict
the use of data and observable usage patterns to services authorized by the user. Based on
a data sharing example scenario for telemetry data collected by cars, we have analyzed
the legal context, representing a consensus on societal values to deduce scenario specific
requirements. With respect to the established requirements, we have analyzed the available
technical building blocks. We exemplified how potentially conflicting individual values
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can be considered when combining these building blocks to balance the various trade-offs
inherent to the possible design alternatives.
Overall, we come to the conclusion that the technical means to implement UC-SDS are
available, while possible combinations of the respective building blocks have not been
thoroughly investigated yet. In addition to improving usability, UC-SDS requires a careful
analysis of societal and individual values, according to the scenario under consideration,
to realize a well-balanced solution. Thus, our work represents the first step towards a
value-oriented design of User-Centric Secure Data Sharing.
For future work, we plan to thoroughly examine a UC-SDS scenario, identifying a compre-
hensive set of affected values. Implementing the building blocks, we envisage a prototypical
realization, which can be used to investigate the practical feasibility of UC-SDS.
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